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Abstract
It remains at best controversial to claim, non-figuratively, that plants are cognitive 
agents. At the same time, it is taken as trivially true that many (if not all) animals 
are cognitive agents, arguably through an implicit or explicit appeal to natural sci-
ence. Yet, any given definition of cognition implicates at least some further pro-
cesses, such as perception, action, memory, and learning, which must be observed 
either behaviorally, psychologically, neuronally, or otherwise physiologically. Cru-
cially, however, for such observations to be intelligible, they must be counted as evi-
dence for some model. These models in turn point to homologies of physiology and 
behavior that facilitate the attribution of cognition to some non-human animals. But, 
if one is dealing with a model of animal cognition, it is tautological that only ani-
mals can provide evidence, and absurd to claim that plants can. The more substan-
tive claim that, given a general model of cognition, only animals but not plants can 
provide evidence, must be evaluated on its merits. As evidence mounts that plants 
meet established criteria of cognition, from physiology to behavior, they continue to 
be denied entry into the cognitive club. We trace this exclusionary tendency back to 
Aristotle, and attempt to counter it by drawing on the philosophy of modelling and 
a range of findings from plant science. Our argument illustrates how a difference in 
degree between plant and animals is typically mistaken for a difference in kind.
Keywords Homology · Homoplasy · Model organisms · Cognitive modelling · 
Minimal cognition · Aristotle
 * Adam Linson 
 adam.linson@stir.ac.uk
1 University of Stirling, Stirling, UK
2 Universidad de Murcia, Murcia, Spain
 A. Linson, P. Calvo 
1 3
  49  Page 2 of 27
Introduction: What’s in a kingdom name?
Biological taxonomy is anything but straightforward. While there is an obvious rela-
tionship between the branches of the ‘tree of life’ and lines of direct genetic descent, 
there are further complexities in play when it comes to sub-dividing creatures into 
different species and even kingdoms (Whittaker 1969). Branches are defined differ-
ently depending on criteria ranging from operational considerations to various forms 
of ontological classification by natural kind (Bird 2018).
There is also a subtle but enduring historical influence that contributes to how 
scientists and philosophers regard relationships between taxonomy and homology 
(Griffiths 2007; Hall 2003; Scotland 2010). The construal of these relationships is 
especially relevant for cognitive phenomena. Specifically, taxonomic considerations 
influence how behavioral homologies are understood, where the latter are tied to 
such processes as perception, action, memory, and learning (Ereshefsky 2007a).
However, due to how physiology diverges in speciation, there is a strong nor-
mative component to whether any form of an organism’s environmental sensing 
qualifies as perception, or directed movement as action, or demonstrated recall as 
memory, and so on. Crucially, how these notions are defined and modelled theo-
retically influences their empirical investigation. Even though the initiating concepts 
and models are typically revised over decades of research, this is not solely due to an 
accumulation of evidence.
Consider that in the lead-up to the Chemical Revolution, competing sets of exper-
imental evidence were tied to which of two theoretical constructs were accepted, 
phlogiston or caloric (Chang 2010). Similarly, in the lead-up to relativity theory, 
physicists provided evidence for fields in fundamentally different ways, depending 
on whether the construct of material aether was accepted or rejected (Nersessian 
1984). In short, even when evidence confirms the theoretical foundations of a scien-
tific investigation, this does not amount to establishing an ahistorical truth. Moreo-
ver, once a theory has become scientifically secure, history has shown that recalci-
trant evidence can be dismissed repeatedly.
It is in this light that we consider plant cognition (in the general sense indicated 
above). Cognition has long been thought of as the exclusive province of animals. 
Those who insist otherwise may be dismissed as old-fashioned animists, or perhaps 
more charitably, as using poetic license and trafficking in metaphors. In fact, there is 
a substantial body of rigorous scientific evidence which shows that what is widely 
regarded as animal cognition is also found in plants, down to its physiological and 
behavioral basis. We suggest here that at least one reason the preponderance of evi-
dence is largely disregarded, downplayed, or outright ignored is due to the conserved 
momentum of ancient history.
Overview
Aristotle has had an overt and lasting influence throughout the history of philoso-
phy and science. The animal/plant distinction, while scientifically entrenched and 
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seemingly intuitive, in part can be traced back to his distinction between organisms 
with self-motion (locomotive species) and those without (sessile species). The influ-
ence of this ancient baggage can be felt even in otherwise radical recent projects, 
such as making the case for attributing consciousness to non-humans, with the nota-
ble exception of plants—precisely because they lack the “capacity for endogenous 
locomotion” (Reber 2016; cf. Calvo 2018).
Significantly, not only does Aristotle treat locomotion as a marker of cognitive 
agency, thereby excluding plants (Gill 1994), he also regards plants as devoid of 
perception.1 As Freeland (1992) has noted of the sensation of touch, for Aristotle,
it is the most basic of all the senses, the only one common to all animals. Cer-
tain primitive animals [according to his account], such as sponges and ascid-
ians, possess touch alone of all the senses, and this is enough to distinguish 
them from the plants which they otherwise closely resemble. […] He also sees 
[touch] even in primitive animals as providing a basis for certain higher‐order 
cognitive capacities.2 (Freeland 1992)
In what follows, we present a critique of the Aristotelian and arguably derivative 
current approaches to distinguishing plants from animals. Our specific concern is 
the circularity of narrowly defining a relevant process (locomotion or perception) 
to limit the set of organisms that exhibit it, and then proclaiming that one only finds 
capacities that depend on the relevant process (cognition) in those organisms. We 
aim to show that this issue itself revolves around modelling.
While the assumed cognitive distinction between humans and non-human ani-
mals remained in force for millennia, for many, this now has come to be regarded as 
a difference in degree rather than kind. With the current sophistication in modelling 
and experimental research on plants, the time is ripe to get plants admitted into the 
cognitive club. We argue that resistance to this idea is in part because animals and 
plants remain historically reified presumptive natural kinds on opposite sides of the 
cognitive boundary. To put our thesis in perspective, we draw on sources spanning 
from classical antiquity—where natural science and philosophy were more or less 
unified—to contemporary scholarship, where specialized investigations in both sci-
ence and philosophy have critically complemented one another.
The argument we advance here is in general agreement with Allen (2017), who 
welcomes the fact that
cognitive scientists are increasingly applying their models and analyses to sys-
tems above and below the level of a prototypical, multicellular animal with 
a brain, spanning unicellular organisms and systems with just a few hundred 
1 We defer to classics scholars to ground the plausibility of our readings throughout, without delving 
into the myriad internal contradictions and competing interpretations of ancient texts. For such a nuanced 
treatment of Aristotle on animal locomotion, see Gill (1994).
2 Here and throughout, for readability, we omit in-line references to the works of Aristotle in citations of 
other authors; textually relevant details are footnoted. In this passage, the original citations are from De 
Anima (DA), History of Animals (HA), and Parts of Animals (PA).
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neurons below, and to the collective action of colonies or groups of organisms 
above. (Allen 2017)
He contextualizes this inclusive position in relation to the broad (but not unanimous) 
commitment among philosophers to an overly conservative, historically favored 
notion of cognition. Our sympathetic argument, apart from focusing specifically 
on plants, also takes a rather different general approach. Namely, whereas Allen’s 
approach centers on conceptual definitions of cognition, ours centers on models 
of cognition. In this context, we treat models as epistemic tools (Knuuttila 2011), 
which means they are artifacts that are designed, constructed, and manipulated to 
facilitate scientific inquiry.
We argue that, for any arbitrary model of cognition that is not bound to humans 
alone a priori (e.g. by requiring language for cognition), careful theorizing and con-
sideration of scientific evidence will show that plants meet the criteria for cogni-
tion established by the model. Perhaps counterintuitively, this entails that we argue 
against anthropormorphizing plants, and more generally, against zoocentric explana-
tions. In the next section, we situate our position in related work; in the third section 
our focus turns to models; the fourth and fifth sections are concerned with Aristotle, 
kinds, and homologies; the sixth and seventh sections delve more deeply into plant 
science; followed by the concluding section.
Not quite out on a limb: related work
Broadly, we follow the contours here of what philosophical and cognitive theories 
of embodiment and interactive environmental engagement brought about, in pushing 
the boundary of cognition to yield to non-human animals (e.g. Clark 1997; Lakoff 
and Johnson 1999; Wheeler 2005). Our emphasis on bodies and their relationship 
to a niche is also shared with Gibsonian ecological psychology. The view we elabo-
rate has the aforementioned elements and perhaps others in common with Thomp-
son (2007) and Varela et al. (1991), but we adhere only to concepts found in stand-
ard biology and the philosophy (and scientific application) of modelling. Similarly, 
our view shares an emphasis on the role of generalizability in cognitive modelling, 
found in Chemero’s (2009) linking of ecological psychology with dynamical sys-
tems theory.
The orientation of the latter three approaches concerns antirepresentationalism 
in cognitive science, which lies beyond the present scope. There is, however, a sub-
stantive point of divergence we have from the following claim: “it is important to 
distinguish between nonlinear dynamic systems as abstract mathematical models 
and as observable biophysical systems” (Thompson 2007, p. 430). Our position is 
not that this distinction should be collapsed. Rather, it is that the only meaningful 
sense in which an observable biophysical system could be counted as a nonlinear 
dynamic system is in virtue of an appeal to an abstract mathematical model. Such a 
model would be required to interpret observable evidence as evidence for the system 
in question. Normative considerations would support the model definition and also 
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inform the determination of how well the evidence supports the use of the model for 
a particular aim. (This point is elaborated in the next section.)
Although there have been a variety of takes on the relationship between adap-
tation and cognition (see Thompson 2007), our relatively deflationist view on the 
two is simply that adaptive processes can involve any processes relating to achieving 
organism-niche dynamic equilibrium, some but not necessarily all of which may be 
cognitive. In most fields, whatever might be called cognitive processes will exhibit 
a core dependency on a number of constitutive processes, namely, some version 
of environmental sensing (perceiving) and real-time or time-delayed perception-
informed action. The temporal component typically implicates related processes of 
memory and learning in various forms.
Under this broad umbrella of cognition, our specific focus is on correlated physi-
ology and behaviors which underpin lifespan (and species) environmentally interac-
tive processes that are parallel in plants and animals. We use a non-technical sense of 
parallel that may turn out to relate to one or more forms of deep homology (Scotland 
2010), or possibly homoplasy in the sense of Lankester (1870), as has been plau-
sibly suggested (Baluška and Mancuso 2009). We note, however, that even ‘mere’ 
analogy, as Darwin once put it (Hall 2003), would suffice for the present argument. 
Nevertheless, with respect to deep homology, it bears mentioning that there are plant 
homologues of mammalian proteins that support biophysically equivalent adaptive 
physiological mechanisms—and whose genetic profiles indicate common evolution-
ary ancestry (Keller et al. 1998).
Using an analysis of evolutionary convergence, Keijzer (2017) mounts a system-
atic defense of the claim that “plants easily fulfil the requirements” for biologically 
embodied cognition. As Keijzer (2019) later suggests, it appears to be due to tradi-
tionally animal-centric, if not strictly human-centric, psychological concepts such 
as ‘decision-making’ that “claims concerning plant behavior may sound weird or 
simply wrong, despite the evidence supporting such statements”.
Decision-making is particularly important to the sense of cognition relevant here. 
This is because we do not adopt the standard dichotomy of cognitive ‘information 
processing’ and purely dynamical agent-environment interactions (Chemero 2009). 
Nor, however, do we adopt what might be called the classical cognitive informa-
tion processing scheme (sometimes known as the computational theory of mind), 
which leads Burge (2010) to distinguish sensory registration from perception proper, 
in contrast to the present treatment. The classical scheme, also relevant below, is 
one that locates computational cognitive models in the mind of the organism. An 
example of this would be computing the distance between objects in three-dimen-
sional space from a two-dimensional projection. The cognitive models that we refer 
to, however, are not held to be in the mind of the cognizer. Rather, they are descrip-
tive theoretical models for scientific inquiry into cognition. In this sense, they are 
no different than population models, which do not entail that a population computes 
anything, even when computational models are used to describe it.
Using this latter sort of computational approach, Linson et al. (2018) make a case 
for a generalized account of cognition. This generalization in part builds on the same 
modelling approach applied specifically to plants (Calvo and Friston 2017). (We 
address models further in the next section.) These and other related work (including 
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the above references on embodied cognition) are part of a growing body of mutually 
supportive research that pushes back against restricted understandings of notions 
such as cognition, intelligence, and even consciousness, regarding lifeforms includ-
ing (but not limited to) plants (e.g. Baluška and Levin 2016; Baluška and Reber 
2019; Calvo Garzón and Keijzer 2009, 2011; Calvo 2017; Calvo et al. 2017, 2020; 
Corcoran et al. 2020; Karban 2008; Kirchhoff et al. 2018; Marder 2012; Margulis 
2001; Ramstead et al. 2018; Trewavas 2002, 2003, 2014).
The garage doors of cognition
Dissenters to such expanded boundaries remain more prominent. To take a recent 
example of the conservative position, Adams (2018) grants that non-human animals 
can be genuinely cognitive, while still opposing this attribution to plants. The objec-
tion seems to be at least in part due to a classical perspective on cognitive informa-
tion processing. This traditional standpoint views simple systems such as electronic 
garage door openers as adequate models of elementary biological computation that 
fall short of ‘real’ cognition. With this example in mind, Adams (2018) suggests that 
giving animal-like status to (e.g.) decision-making of the sort exhibited by plants 
is akin to applying the Dennettian intentional stance to an electronic garage door 
opener.
Consider, however, that the intentional stance is concerned with beliefs. Spe-
cifically, for Dennett, it implies that there is no special ‘hard’ threshold between 
ascribed ‘as if’ beliefs and ‘real’ beliefs (Dennett 2009). Therefore, according to the 
above critique, plant (and garage door opener) cognition must be ‘as if’ cognition, 
animal cognition must be ‘real’, and proponents of plant cognition must be advocat-
ing no difference between ‘as if’ and ‘real’ cognition. This, however, is a false con-
clusion, once it is understood how accounts of cognition are grounded in modelling.
Notice that Dennett would agree that humans, animals, plants (and garage door 
openers) could be said to have beliefs, without necessarily being cognitive:
even when intentional glosses on (e.g.) tree-activities are of vanishingly small 
heuristic value, it seems to me wiser to grant that such a tree is a very degener-
ate, uninteresting, negligible intentional system than to attempt to draw a line 
above which intentional interpretations are ‘objectively true’. (Dennett 1976, 
p. 180)
But, if Dennett’s intentional stance methodology requires that beliefs be treated as 
part of a behavioral modelling exercise, then beliefs can be modelled as having been 
formed at least in part through perception, memory, learning, and so on. Decision-
making can be added to the model as acting on beliefs. It is perfectly consistent to 
say that there are empirically identifiable processes of perception, action, memory, 
and learning that are best understood through models of cognition that include belief 
attributions, where beliefs are the only element that is equally ‘as if’ and ‘real’. From 
this perspective, the question concerning what constitutes ‘real’ cognition shifts to 
how its constitutive processes are physically implemented.
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In this respect of implementation, we are in agreement with Sloman (1988) 
that the ‘design stance’ must be the arbiter of whether and how extrinsic behav-
ior emerges from intrinsic capacity. That is to say that the components within the 
organismic boundary must be organized in a particular way (a ‘design’) for ‘real’ 
cognition or its constitutive processes such as memory to emerge. By this measure, 
a garage door opener does not ‘remember’ if the door is open or closed based on a 
persistent internal state within an electronic circuit, yet it behaves as if it does (the 
bare encapsulation of a past state is not the character of memory that is of interest, 
as we explain below). However, according to controlled experiments, using mod-
els in part based on invertebrate and vertebrate neurons, even unicellular organisms 
can remember their spatial trajectories (Kunita et al. 2016). This latter simple form 
of memory at least constitutes a better scientific model of complex human memory 
than a garage door opener. From the design stance, simplicity does not adjudicate 
between ‘as if’ and ‘real’ cognition; either can be simple or complex.
One variety of simple biological models, known as model organisms, is often 
used to investigate target phenomena through the use of homologies. (We expand 
on this point in the next section.) As Kaplan (2017) points out, neuroscientists began 
to investigate the critical role of long-term potentiation (LTP) in memory based on 
rodents and rabbits, and later in macaques, to establish its role in human memory. 
Further research then showed the same mechanism was also present outside of 
mammals, in sea slugs. More recently, molecular and other subcellular aspects of 
LTP have been identified that appear to subserve memory not only in animals, but 
also (homologously) in plants, although more research is needed (Michmizos and 
Hilioti 2019).
What is important to the present discussion is how the meaningful character of a 
cognitively constitutive process (e.g. memory) is maintained in inquiry. For exam-
ple, if memory is characterized as being reflected in the ability to read out an encap-
sulated past state, then not only would humans and garage door openers be adequate 
subjects of an inquiry into memory, but so would a ‘memory foam’ cushion. This is 
obviously inadequate. Crucially, however, an inquiry on biological memory could 
still use a synthetic stand-in or computer simulation in place of a living being. The 
point is that there is something specific of interest about the target cognitive phe-
nomenon that is reflected in biological exemplars, which may be studied in various 
ways.
Currents, models, and current models: philosophy, theory, 
and practice
The claim that animals, but not plants, can have “internal states that mean (in the 
sense of have truth values) things outside the system”, or “that are possibly false 
in what they represent”, or “that have as part of their meaning a non-existent future 
state of affairs” (Adams 2018) is to miss that these are features of an animal model 
of cognition that was once regarded as a strictly human model. When further 
research on animals revealed that their cognitive processes could be modelled in a 
manner equivalent to humans (see Allen and Bekoff 1999), what was previously a 
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rigid boundary was replaced by a point on a complexity continuum. (It is not widely 
disputed that humans exhibit more complex cognition than other animals.)
Crucially, it is a model of human cognition that tells us, for example, that 
behavioral and/or linguistic evidence indicates to an observer that a subject 
holds a belief Q, even if the model remains implicit in such usage. Additional 
psychological, neuronal or other physiological evidence could indicate that a 
subject holds a belief Q, using a variety of methodological strategies that may 
reveal a controlled formation or disruption of the belief, for instance, depend-
ing on the model. When new technologies of observation and methodological 
procedures are established, it may transpire that an existing model can accom-
modate new evidence. For example, where one once might have said, “it must be 
‘as if’ there is weather on Mars”, it is now accepted that there is ‘real’ weather 
on Mars, by appealing to Earth-derived numerical models constrained by newly 
available observational data (Leovy 2001). In a related sense, there is no need 
to appeal to ‘as if’ cognition or other anthropomorphisms to undertake a cogni-
tive ethology of animals, plants, and earlier lifeforms, when drawing on observa-
tions. There is, however, a need to appeal to models.
Many organisms may be counted as cognitive analogues, not necessarily in 
an evolutionary sense (see Kaplan 2017), but in the sense of being “concrete” 
models (Weisberg 2013). This describes models that are (or could be) physically 
instantiated, like model cells or organisms. Concrete models are used in contem-
porary science to understand a broader class of phenomena found in other physi-
cal instantiations. For example, a generic eukaryotic cell may be used as a model 
of how certain organelles or membranes behave generally, or a mouse may be 
used to understand human neurophysiology.
Two (or possibly three) aspects of concrete modelling are of interest here. The 
first pertains to empirically linked homologies, such as those which demonstrate 
that mouse and human brains are evolutionarily continuous. This known conti-
nuity certainly contributes to the use of mice as model organisms for humans. 
However, even if such a continuity were empirically disproved, a second aspect 
could also support the use of a model organism; namely, a demonstrated equiva-
lence to the target with respect to the model’s role in practice. For instance, a 
completely synthetic mouse-like creature designed to exhibit the same observ-
able responses to pharmacological agents as humans could turn out to be empiri-
cally robust as a model organism.
When more abstract attributions are considered, such as a “defensive 
response”, this is closely related to the second aspect, but could be regarded as a 
third. For example, it is one thing to say that a synthetic mouse runs to or from 
a cat upon the ingestion of a certain drug, but it is quite another to call this a 
modulation of its defensive response. Here, the matter pertains to the target as 
much as the model: what constitutes a defensive response? That this is a nor-
mative matter rather than a perspective-free one can be made clear if the ques-
tion is restated: using what model under what methodological conditions should 
an observation be counted as evidence of a defensive response? (This is meant 
only as an illustration; however, it seems most if not all organismic defensive 
responses entail cognitive processes as we define them.)
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Neutral or normative?
The normative matters play out in such cases in the decisions on what constitutes 
the observable processes and their interrelationship. If models of defensive behav-
ior account for perceiving and discriminating a threat and acting responsively, or 
models of memory account for perceiving and subsequently demonstrating recall, 
then the constitutive components are as important as the target phenomenon. On 
this basis, without any invocation of anthropomorphism, it is justifiable to grant that 
even unicellular eukaryotes and protists are perceivers, in so far as they exhibit a 
defensive repertoire and memory defined in the preceding way. These attributions 
are justified using models and observations of the constitutive and integrated capaci-
ties provided by controlled experiments on cellular mechanics, biochemistry, and 
behavior (Dexter et al. 2019; Kunita et al. 2016). Once it is granted that modelling 
and experimental evidence can demonstrate how behavior emerges from physiologi-
cal underpinnings in a similar manner across species or kingdoms, many imagined 
dividing lines fade in significance.
Our view shares much in common with the earlier incarnations of the life-mind 
continuity thesis (Godfrey-Smith 1994; Wheeler 1997), but our central argument is 
not that life is proto-cognitive. The more indirect affinity we have with those views 
comes from a level of generality centered on the whole organism at which lines are 
blurred between life, adaptation, and cognition. At this level of generality, a non-
exhaustive characterization of fundamentals for modelling biological, adaptive, cog-
nitive systems can be given as follows:
 (i) An organism-niche boundary (even if ultimately transitory over longer time-
scales),
 (ii) A set of organismic mechanisms implicated in processes for niche-perceiving 
and niche-acting-upon that subserve gaining fuel and avoiding harm (even if 
ultimately transitory in development), and
 (iii) Mediation of the processes in (ii) by endogenous electrical activity.
This list is deliberately broad enough to encompass competing mainstream view-
points, including purely process ontologies (Nicholson and Dupre 2018). Notice 
that, even upon close scrutiny, no intrinsic distinction between plants and animals 
follows from (i) through (iii). Yet, this distinction, mirroring the classifications of 
Plantae and Animalia, remains forcefully operative. To maintain the distinction, one 
can point to various differential factors, such as cell types. But, ultimately, even cell 
types are implicated in physiological processes that support behavioral capacities.
From this perspective, cell biology and locomotion—the latter regarded as 
a principal plant/animal dividing line (we will get to brains later on)—are funda-
mentally interrelated. Although locomotion may appear as a neutral criterion, it 
is normatively privileged over other organismic strategies that accomplish similar 
ends. For instance, locomotion plays a role in defensive and foraging behaviors, and 
yet these behaviors are also identified in non-locomoting organisms. At the physi-
ological level, the cellular mechanics and biochemistry of animal muscle action and 
the directed, coordinated contraction and  expansion action of plants are based on 
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near-identical molecular and mechanically similar subcellular processes (Gorshk-
ova et al. 2018; Simons 1992). Proprioceptive sensing for bodily self-positioning is 
found in plants as well as animals (Bastien et al. 2013). As suggested above with the 
generalizable subcellular basis of memory, in a similar manner, locomotion could 
be modelled as a special case of the general capacity for directed spatial traversal. 
Instead, more frequently, locomoting organisms—i.e. animals, but not plants—are 
treated as an essential kind, which brings us back to Aristotle.
Ancient roots: rise of the walled Kingdoms
Among classics scholars, there is a broad consensus that Aristotle—founder of zool-
ogy, among other contributions—had an idiosyncratic reading of his forerunner Par-
menides (see e.g. Loux 1992). An alternative reading of Parmenides was offered 
by Aristotle’s student, Theophrastus, known as the founder of botany. The latter’s 
take on Parmenidean naturalism can be summed up succinctly: sense perception and 
further cognition of the world is attained by beings through their internal activity 
of light or heat (Bredlow 2011). Looking back to the ancient world, we note that it 
is neither anachronistic nor audacious to read ‘internal activity of light or heat’ as 
being related to endogenous electrical energy.3 (This will take on added significance 
in the section after next, “Getting nervous: the electrophysiology of plants”.)
While Theophrastus offered insight into the systematic ecology of plants and ani-
mals as co-equals engaged in parallel organism-niche dynamics (Hughes 1985), it 
was of course the Aristotelian hierarchical animal/plant dichotomy that took hold. 
This is epitomized in early modernity by Linnaeus’s systematic botany and zool-
ogy, which continues to undergird contemporary biology and cognitive science 
(Kutschera and Briggs 2009). Ironically, the highly influential Linnaean taxonomy, 
and its direct predecessor, that of John Ray, were derived from theories of ‘gen-
erative’ (reproductive) descent based on research into plant species (Wilkins 2009). 
Despite this derivation, in most of the biological literature, plant/animal parallels are 
scarcely if ever considered, with notable exceptions that we draw on here. In particu-
lar, the alternative perspective Theophrastus offered is echoed by none other than 
Darwin, albeit in his largely overlooked writings on plants, which we refer to below.
There is some controversy surrounding interpretations of the Aristotelian 
approach, especially regarding questions of species essentialism (Lennox 2005, 
2009; Stein 2018; Winsor 2003). We will clarify a narrow aspect of this, while side-
stepping the central debates about species that seem to rage on in philosophy of 
3 Before Parmenides, a limited understanding of the natural phenomenon of electrical energy was 
already grasped by Thales of Miletus (c. 624–546 BCE), who essentially coined (repurposed) the term 
‘electron’, meaning amber. This was based on static electrical phenomena of deliberately caused amber 
friction, in other words, basic experimental physics of electromagnetism. Subsequently, Aristotle and 
Theophrastus were aware of the electrical discharge of the torpedo ray, including aspects of its transmis-
sibility through a medium and human physiological electric shock effects. See e.g. Green and Hazard 
(1809); see also Finger and Piccolino (2011), pp. 36ff. Moreover, according to the comprehensive analy-
sis of Theophrastus on Parmenides by Bredlow (2011), our claim could be pushed further still: it appears 
to be an ancient theory of the relationship between environmental and organismic energetic excitation 
that is remarkably consistent with contemporary biophysical accounts.
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biology (Zachos 2016), such as whether species should be construed as individuals 
(Ereshefsky 2007b), as synchronic or diachronic entities (Stamos 2002), and other 
related distinctions. More directly related to the present context, Griffiths (1994) dis-
cusses species, clades, and philosophical kindhood, but with a stronger emphasis 
on common ancestry than we require here. Also of note, Ereshefsky and Reydon 
(2015) offer a detailed account of kinds in relation to species, with a dedicated focus 
on epistemology.4 In contrast to these analyses, our primary concern is with models 
of cognition, rather than conceptions of species (although we suggest how the latter 
can have implications for the former).
The closest account to our own is not focused on cognition, but rather on Aristo-
tle’s conception of human rationality (Boyle 2017). Boyle notes that the Aristotelian 
difference in kind is reflected “not merely by a trait” possession, but by “a character-
istic whose presence transforms what it is to be” that kind of creature (Boyle 2017, 
p. 114). This shows that Aristotle is not concerned with isolable capacities that add 
further powers to an existing stock, but rather, with “a global transformation of the 
kind of living being that bears [these] capacities” (Boyle 2017, p. 116). Perhaps sur-
prisingly, this speaks to our core argument about modelling, in that it suggests that 
the model one would need to adequately reflect (e.g.) language use would exhibit a 
qualitative difference from simpler proto-language models.5
Given Aristotle’s historically constrained insufficient technical apparatus, he 
could not avoid overlooking significant aspects of plants. He thus presumed that 
locomotion and perception were evidence of a fundamental kind transformation 
from plants to animals (whereas his human story seems largely to have turned out 
to be right). Unfortunately, however, his inadequate a posteriori analysis has become 
an a priori premise of contemporary accounts of cognition, mediated by a later taxo-
nomic kingdom division.
Below, we examine how taxa (as reflective of kinds) influence models that can 
either reveal or obscure homologies. This emphasis requires us to examine a specific 
issue that arises in Aristotelian inquiry. More generally, setting aside the exclusion 
of plants, the below account remains compatible with Wheeler’s understanding of 
Aristotle as a viable foundation for biological cognitive science (Wheeler 1997).
Some are more equal than others
Following Lennox (2005), it can be said that Aristotle’s approach to sub-dividing 
(effectively natural) kinds was to proceed by finding clusters of co-extensive features 
that include capacities and morphological traits, before moving on to infer causal 
and/or functional explanations. In this context, high-level groupings such as ‘leg-
ged’ creatures provide only a provisional, preliminary attempt at sub-division. In 
the process of inquiry, these initial divisions are almost immediately supplanted by 
4 The level of generality that suffices here roughly relates to the cases they describe in which ‘ordinary 
kinds’ correspond to ‘scientific kinds’, as we believe to be historically the case with plants and animals.
5 For a more detailed example, Corcoran et al. (2020) examine how the transformative cognitive capac-
ity of counterfactual evaluation by organisms can be reflected by the addition of hierarchical levels to a 
computational model.
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further sub-division (in this case, into bipeds, quadrupeds, etc.). This process even-
tually concludes with what are regarded as epistemically valuable indivisible groups, 
deemed worthy of playing a role in later stages of inquiry (Boyle 2017; Stein 2018).
Thus, when Aristotle identifies as common to all living beings—plants, animals, 
and humans—such properties as growth, decay, and transformative development, it 
is clear then that this comprises an early entry point into his sub-dividing venture. 
(A categorization of this breadth, however, is not as disposable for Theophrastus, in 
so far as it would be co-extensive with the class of beings with ‘internal activity of 
light or heat’.) Following the living/non-living division, Aristotle cleaves apart the 
class of living things into a further dichotomy, with plants on one side, animals on 
the other, retaining humans as a special case of animals. As described above, Aris-
totle views plants as the only subset of living beings that lack perception and self-
motion, in addition to lacking the related property of rationality.
Already at the outset of this Aristotelian naturalist enterprise, plants are excluded 
from further animal sub-divisions, for instance, those that distinguish modes of loco-
motion (terrestrial, aerial, aquatic) and related capacities (e.g. hunting and foraging). 
These and other features contribute to what Aristotle regards as different ‘modes of 
life’ (bios) that bear on correlations with morphological features: being aerial and 
having wings; being a winged predator and having a curved beak (Lennox 2005; 
see also Lennox 2009). If the first grouping picks out birds, the second supports a 
continuity relation in a similarity space among ‘forms’ of bird mouths, for instance, 
between curved beaks and the flat bills of some non-predatory birds.
Through this enumeration process, Aristotle also aims to discover discontinuous 
analogues (e.g. bird:wing :: fish:fin). These initial correlated observations then sup-
port subsequent analyses that produce properly causal/functional epistemic claims: 
animals (birds, fish) have appendages (wings, fins) to locomote across their niche 
(air, water) (Lennox 2005). Notice that this sort of conclusion is not far afield from 
an account of homology found in contemporary philosophy of biology:
behavioral homologies and homologies of function in anatomy can form [an] 
independent level of homology, with the anatomical structures that support 
function being transformed over time whilst the behavioral character or the 
functional character (e.g. the biomechanical profile of a movement) remains 
the same. (Griffiths 2006)
In other words, despite the species-specific anatomy of wings and fins that continued 
to diverge from the appendage of a common ancestor, aspects of their use in niche-
relative locomotion were conserved.
It is notable that homologies of physiology and behavior play a crucial role in 
biological theorizing from Aristotle to the present, even as Aristotelian theory and 
natural selection differ fundamentally in their characterizations of speciation. With 
respect to our overarching point, if—in both the ancient and modern worlds—plants 
are initially regarded as non-perceiving and non-acting, then they are excluded pre-
maturely from the process of inquiry by which discontinuous analogies or behavio-
ral/functional homologies can establish a basic equality of kinds (e.g. fish alongside 
birds). We further consider this issue in the next section.
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Stay planted or go loco: selective pressure on locomotive capacity
In an increasingly oft-cited passage, Darwin (1875) observed in The Movements and 
Habits of Climbing Plants that:
It has often been vaguely asserted that plants are distinguished from animals 
by not having the power of movement. It should rather be said that plants 
acquire and display this power only when it is of some advantage to them; this 
being of comparatively rare occurrence, as they are affixed to the ground, and 
food is brought to them by the air and rain. (Darwin 1875, p. 206)
From the perspective of ecological-evolutionary models, apart from questions of 
descent and similarity, it must be asked, why is animal locomotion stably selected 
for? A straightforward answer is that animals rely on locomotion to find fuel in their 
niche, transform their niche, avoid harm, and secure their reproduction. Put differ-
ently, the sensory and action capacities of animals facilitate their adaptive behavior, 
matching sessile plants in this respect. While parallel molecular and electrophysi-
ological processes underpin organismic function in both, plants simply have a dif-
ferent set of means to find fuel in their niche, transform their niche, avoid harm, and 
secure their reproduction. For instance, without untethered locomotion to forage for 
distal food, plants use directed growth to traverse spatial distances, facilitating how 
food is brought to them for autotrophic organic synthesis (Trewavas 2002).
When the natural behaviors of sessile plants and locomoting animals are under-
stood as emergent from capacities shaped by basic adaptive pressures, it undermines 
the case that only animal capacities should be designated as cognitive. As we expand 
on below, varieties of both plants and animals anticipate and act on their environ-
ments on multiple nested timescales, while responding to environmental contingen-
cies. Both indicate (bidirectional) niche adaptation, ranging from molecular biology 
to physiology to behavioral dynamics. In so far as a subset of these processes can 
be modelled as perception, action, memory, and learning, it is unclear what, if any-
thing, is missing for at least some plants to count as cognizers.
Note that the morphological differences that underpin parallel adaptive process 
roles are present even between most animal species, as we saw above with bird 
wings and fish fins being implicated in locomotion (irrespective of their common 
ancestry). For a more illustrative example at this point in our argument, consider 
that some animals have gills and some have lungs, and that generally, these morpho-
logical structures and their constitutive low-level mechanisms are implicated in the 
environmental exchange of nutrients and waste, i.e. respiration. Moreover, the pro-
cess of respiration is governed by electromechanical and electrochemical coordina-
tion. Notice, however, that this is true not only of gills and lungs, but also of leaves 
and roots. Plants adaptively alter aspects of their positioning pertinent to respiration 
via a network of intercellular interactions (Simons 1992).6
6 It is not disputed that there are specific biophysical/physiological distinctions between animal and plant 
respiration (see Taiz and Zeiger 2010).
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The further significance of this example over and above the previous wing-fin 
locomotion example is that the respiratory process parallels between gills and lungs 
suggests (misleadingly) that these morphological differences are more similar to one 
another—in virtue of them belonging to animals—than either of them are to the 
morphology that underpins a parallel respiratory process in plants. This issue turns 
up when Boyle (2017) states that (“arguably”) the difference between (e.g.) echolo-
cating and non-echolocating animals is not a transformative fundamental difference, 
in contrast to equivalent differences between animals and plants (pp. 115–116). But, 
if equally complex processes of environmental sensing in some animals and some 
plants can be modelled as physiological and behavioral homologues, the similarities 
between them should have greater salience than the contingent divergences in imple-
mentation. As Godfrey-Smith (2017) emphasizes, gradations of cognitive complex-
ity in homologous sensing, evaluating, and behavior can be found everywhere, as 
can landmark leaps: “sensing itself is ubiquitous; it is seen in unicellular organisms 
and plants as well as animals”—while even within the narrow arena of sensing by 
animal eyes, one can make various arguments for transformatively fundamental dis-
tinctions, such as low versus high resolution (p. 221).
Lumbering under the yoke
The respiration example above builds on the earlier quote from Griffiths (2006) on 
homologies of function in anatomy, and connects it to another:
The wing of a European house sparrow is homologous to the wing of a fla-
mingo – both are avian wings. The avian wing is homologous to the forelimb 
of a lizard – both are tetrapod forelimbs. The tetrapod forelimb is homologous 
to the pectoral fin of a sarcopterygian fish – both are instances of the anterior 
paired appendages of Sarcopterygii. None of these relationships is a matter of 
degree – the avian wing is not more or less a homologue of the pectoral fin any 
more than the class Aves is more or less part of the Sarcopterygii or a sparrow 
more or less a bird. (Griffiths 2006, emphasis added)
We must emphasize again that we are using a less restrictive sense of homology than 
described above, but the point regarding all-or-nothing similarity remains. Return-
ing to Aristotle’s method of discontinuous analogies across sub-divisions, to under-
score our emphasis, we note that a premature exclusion of plants from an inquiry 
into the processes and mechanisms of respiratory regulation—simply because plants 
are not thought to ‘really’ breathe—thereby establishes an equality between (e.g.) 
animal gill and lung, while plants are (unjustifiably) relegated to the lower ranks.
That something such as respiration is not exclusive to animals may appear to 
have minor significance. The critical point, however, is that whether such a capacity 
extends beyond animals is far from being a ‘pure’ empirical matter. For this reason, 
the a priori boundaries of any comparative approach to organisms gains crucial rel-
evance when considering what have traditionally been regarded as mind-involving 
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processes such as decision-making, problem-solving, joint action, and more (Kei-
jzer 2019). These processes relate directly to more general capacities and attributes 
such as cognition and agency, both of which are bound up with ancient notions of 
self-motion (Gill 1994). Since Aristotle, there has been almost no subsidence in the 
historical tendency to deem plants as lacking in these respects.
To be clear, we do not impute high-level functions to morphological attributes. 
Rather, the (broadly speaking) comparative biology approach we adopt instead looks 
at morphological features as implementing mechanisms that play a role in low-level 
physiological processes. From the interoperation of lower levels, high-level pro-
cesses emerge with observable functional roles in adaptive context (e.g. gills, lungs, 
leaves and roots are integral to the set of mechanisms implicated in respiratory pro-
cesses that subserve niche-relative organism homeostasis). Thus, for instance, the 
cellular specializations of plants provide an alternative set of constraints on forms 
of cognition equivalent to those of animals (Calvo et al. 2017; Calvo and Trewavas 
2020).
Building on and aligning with our earlier consideration of modelling general bio-
logical, adaptive, cognitive fundamentals not limited to animals (i–iii), we can now 
point to a corresponding multi-level organization (right-hand column) that could be 
reflected in generalized biological models of emergent cognitive processes (percep-
tion, memory, etc.):
General fundamentals Organizational fundamentals
(i) An organism-niche boundary (even if ulti-
mately transitory over longer timescales),
(i′) A body-environment interface,
(ii) A set of organismic mechanisms implicated in 
processes for niche-perceiving and niche-acting-
upon that subserve gaining fuel and avoiding 
harm (even if ultimately transitory in develop-
ment), and
(ii′) Cellular level activity (with endogenous cor-
respondence to environmental and bodily states), 
and
(iii) Mediation of the processes in (ii) by endog-
enous electrical activity.
(iii′) Further activity involving coordinated popula-
tions of cells (or subcellular entities).
These ‘levels’ (right-hand column) affect each other (vertically) in both directions, 
with different degrees of complexity across species. However, such cognitive com-
plexity does not simply increase linearly from plants to animals as convention tends 
to suggest—some instances of plant complexity exceed some instances of animal 
complexity.
Simpler animals and plants (and beyond) exhibit shallower nesting of spatiotem-
porally situated behavior, with environmental responsiveness unfolding over short 
time scales and close spatial range. As organismic complexity increases, so too 
does the number of nested spatiotemporal levels of behavior (Corcoran et al. 2020; 
Linson et  al. 2018; Sims 2019; see also Calvo et  al. 2020). In other words, such 
complexity in cognitive systems brings greater integration of increasingly longer-
term, wider-range goals, arguably in order to meet their own increased (adaptive) 
demands, to survive and thrive. Sufficient cognitive complexity makes possible 
(but does not guarantee) certain transformative capacities, such as the capacity to 
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re-evaluate a prospective decision and make an alternative decision, which may not 
extend beyond humans. But current models of cognition and available evidence do 
not reflect any such transformatively fundamental difference between (all) plants 
and animals.
Getting nervous: the electrophysiology of plants
In this section, we consider the convergence of cognitive models and evidence that 
contextualizes the superficially transformative difference between the brains found 
in animals but absent in plants. There is no question that brains are a morphologi-
cally localized development involved in coordinating coherent behavior. The ques-
tion, however, is whether the coordination of coherent behavior with and without 
such a morphological localization can be biologically modelled in a similar manner. 
That is, setting aside universal formal abstractions such as dynamical systems mod-
els, can we understand the plant/animal analogy in terms of the emergence of cogni-
tive behavior from physiology?
According to Darwin (1875), a number of behavioral and cognitive “animal fea-
tures” were shared by plants, specifically, Dionea muscipula (the Venus flytrap) and 
Mimosa pudica (the ‘sensitive’ plant).7 This perspective on plants was not merely a 
metaphor, but rather, it informed his concrete elaboration of a ‘root-brain’ (Baluška 
et al. 2009). As Darwin saw it, an intriguing parallel could be drawn between plant 
roots and the brains of “lower” animals. Another oft-cited passage, from his penulti-
mate book, The power of movement in plants (Darwin and Darwin 1880), states that:
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the tip of the radicle thus endowed [with 
sensitivity] and having the power of directing the movements of the adjoining 
parts, acts like the brain of one of the lower animals; the brain being seated 
within the anterior end of the body, receiving impressions from the sense-
organs, and directing the several movements. (Darwin and Darwin 1880), p. 
573
The ‘root-brain’ concept took on broader significance in the context of a wider sci-
entific inquiry that linked animal neurophysiology and plants, beginning around the 
turn of the last century—and which had a lasting impact, despite being overlooked 
for interim periods (Williams 1976).
Darwin hypothesized that electrical impulses could underlie fast responses in car-
nivorous plants, but he lacked the experimental toolkit to settle the matter. In the 
Royal Society, Darwin shared his insights with Sir John Burdon-Sanderson, a cir-
cumstantially ideal combination of medical doctor, botanist, and physiologist, who 
held successive professorships at UCL and Oxford. Their London meetings led to a 
7 It is uncertain, but possible, that Darwin read the work of John Ray’s contemporary, Nehemiah Grew. 
Grew seems to anticipate Darwin, with an implicit nod to Theophrastus, when he speaks of “the Sensible 
Natures of Vegetables, and of their more Recluse Faculties and Powers” in his 1672 Royal Society lec-
ture, “An Idea of a Philosophical History of Plants”, cited in Wilkins (2009).
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series of electrophysiological studies of plants, specifically, on their nervelike action 
potentials and related phenomena (Burdon-Sanderson 1873, 1877, 1882, 1888). The 
initial published findings on Dionaea electrophysiology set off a wave of subsequent 
research on ‘animal-like’ plant physiology and corresponding adaptive behavior, 
during which action potentials were measured in other plant species.
J.C. Bose continued biophysical and electrophysiological research on Mimosa 
and other plants (Bose 1907, 1913, 1926, 1928). As he observed in The Nervous 
Mechanism of Plants (Bose 1926), we cannot but acknowledge the “nervous charac-
ter of the impulse transmitted to a distance” in plants. While Bose came to such con-
clusions decades before most others, subsequent research has borne out many of his 
once controversial claims (Shepherd 2005).8 Notably, Bose showed that plants have 
a coherent network of electrically excitable tissues that play a similar role to that of 
animal nervous systems.9
Getting excited
Echoing Darwin’s claim about the analogue between plants and ‘lower animals’, 
contemporary investigations into plant electrophysiology have confirmed that “while 
most plants have little need of a nervous system as sophisticated as that of higher 
animals, at least some of them have a system comparable with that of the lower 
forms of animal life” (Goldsworthy 1983, p. 648). Specifically,
plants which show rapid movements in response to action potentials have 
arisen independently at many diverse points in evolution, ranging from the 
insectivorous plants of the Droseraceae, through Mimosa in the Leguminosae 
to the motile stamens of the barberry. These plants initiate their action poten-
tials in response to touch … All that is needed is for certain cells of the plant to 
be hypersensitive so that permeability to ions is increased by relatively minor 
mechanical deformation. Such cells occur just below the tentacle head in Dro-
sera and at the base of the trigger hairs in Dionaea. They respond to mechani-
cal stress as if they had been injured. They first become depolarized, gener-
ating the so-called receptor potential which triggers action potentials which 
propagate through the neighboring cells to the motor regions. (Goldsworthy 
1983, p. 647)
The conclusion of this description of Dionaea is referring to the fact that upon the 
first disturbance of a mechanoreceptive ‘trigger hair’, as when a fly has landed on 
it, a relatively slow-moving action potential spreads over the trap, without leading 
to any visible movement. If a second stimulation occurs within approximately 30 s, 
8 Even in his own time, he describes in the preface to The Motor Mechanism of Plants (Bose 1928) how 
scientific incredulity toward his work subsided once his instrument calibrations were validated by the 
Fellows of the Royal Society, his results were replicated at the Physiological Institute of the University of 
Vienna, and so on.
9 See De Loof (2016) for grounded speculation on what he terms the ‘electrome’ (analogous to genome), 
to describe “the electrical dimension of biological systems”.
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it sets off a fast-moving action potential that leads to the rapid shutting of the trap 
(Hedrich and Neher 2018; Trebacz et  al. 2006). Accidental closures  are thereby 
reduced, which saves on energetically costly resetting, as actual prey typically 
causes multiple stimulations within the allotted time. This reflects a biological basis 
for perceptual discrimination that can be modelled in the same way as far more com-
plex perceptual discrimination by humans, using (Bayesian) decision theory (e.g. 
Parr et al. 2019).
It was not until the turn of the last century that it was established in multiple inde-
pendent laboratories that some plants were “equipped with various mechanorecep-
tors exceeding the sensitivity of a human finger” (Stahlberg 2006). One can ponder 
what might have been if Aristotle had enjoyed the benefits of modern technology 
and experimental data, in light of the fact that he believed mechanoreceptors were 
present in animals but absent in plants. As Freeland (1992) notes, Aristotle refers to 
a “special sort of ‘mean’” that animals possess but plants lack. This sense of ‘mean’ 
describes a biological substrate that gauges the degree of environmental impact, for 
parameters such as pressure. She explains that this “would make more sense to us if 
we redescribed it as the claim that animal bodies include neural cells. For the sense 
of touch, these cells today are designated ‘mechanoreceptors’” (Freeland 1992).
It would be fair to say that brains remain more decisive than locomotion for dis-
tinguishing animals from plants in most contemporary cognitive research programs. 
Yet, brains are a morphological feature whose functional substrate is primarily 
understood in electrochemical terms. Thus, it is unproblematic to note that some 
aspects of brainbound phenomena may be mirrored in less centralized morphologi-
cal features. In this light, it is notable that there is great diversity in plant electri-
cal events, with some appearing when evoked and others spontaneously, displaying 
a range of fluctuation profiles that include self-propagating and localized activity 
(Pickard 1973). Together with other physiological mechanisms such as chemical 
coordination, plants are undoubtedly complex systems amenable to models of emer-
gent behavioral dynamics (Volkov 2012). On this basis, it is increasingly argued that 
some plants may even be equipped to actively prioritize competing demands (Calvo 
et al. 2017; Züst and Agrawal 2017).
In higher plants (i.e. more recent species), organism-wide action-perception loops 
are coordinated in the glomerulus, a structure of richly interconnected phloem bun-
dles (Behnke 1990). The glomerulus permits plants to sample and integrate a num-
ber of biotic and abiotic parameters in real time (Trewavas 2002). A coordinated 
bioelectrical network is effectively comprised of membranes of plant cells along the 
vascular system, which stretches throughout the plant body in the form of vascular 
bundles of phloem, xylem and cambium (Fromm and Lautner 2006). By measuring 
the overall electrical excitability of the cellular pathways connecting plant receptor 
and effector sites (Trebacz et al. 2006), a common metric can be established with 
animal innervation. Specifically, the former can mirror the connectivity in animals 
that links graded potentials in peripheral nerves and trains of action potentials in the 
central nervous system.
In sum, the cognitive process-supporting machinery most commonly associated 
with—and typically uniquely attributed to—animals, was identified in plants, not 
only in the ancient world by Parmenides and Theophrastus, but also by experimental 
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science from the early twentieth century to the present. Such empirical findings 
on the complex bioelectrical networks that inhere in plants, and can be shown to 
facilitate aspects of cognitive behavior, support the argument for counting plants as 
straightforwardly cognitive (Baluška and Mancuso 2013; Segundo-Ortin and Calvo 
2019). We avoid the anthropomorphism worry of Taiz et  al. (2019) by relating 
cognition to whole-organism physiological coherence for self and niche response 
and modulation, which requires neither an animal brain nor a zoocentric classical 
information processing scheme. Moreover, the role of modelling we emphasize can 
contextualize animal-specific neurochemical interactions as implementations of 
cross-kingdom homologues, building on our previous examples of respiration and 
long-term potentiation. Is this approach too permissive? The next section resists 
this charge by further underscoring the complexity entailed even by ‘simple’ plant 
cognition.
The agent is a plant: active botanical behavior
Many potential candidates for adjudicating the cognitive boundary between plants 
and animals fall short in the face of mounting scientific evidence for a common 
model. One such candidate would be social cognition, which, when transformed by 
language, takes on a specific character in humans. Language-based social cognition 
indeed marks a difference in kind between human social cognition and that of non-
human animals. However, this need not point to an equivalent difference between 
non-human animals and plants.
At the very least, constitutive processes of social cognition such as self/non-self 
discrimination and kinship networks have been empirically identified in plants. Self/
non-self discrimination in plants is facilitated by integrated physiological coordina-
tion involving oscillatory dynamics (Gruntman and Novoplansky 2004). A separate 
mechanism, related to root chemical exhudates (secretions), subserves the ability 
for plants to discriminate species kin from non-kin ‘strangers’ (Biedrzycki and Bais 
2010; Biedrzycki et al. 2010; Crepy and Casal 2015; Dudley and File 2007; Sem-
chenko et al. 2014). Both mechanisms pertain to survival with respect to the allo-
cation of and competition over (endogenous and exogenous) resources. This again 
emphasizes the entanglement of biological, cognitive, and adaptive behavior.
Another candidate might be cognition-involving defensive behavior. Above, we 
noted that even single-celled organisms have been shown to exhibit this with the 
cognitive components of perceptual discrimination and responsive action coordina-
tion. Plants are no different in this respect, but as with simpler organisms, the requi-
site intricacy for scientific inquiry has only recently become possible.
How might the present-day chasm between zoology and botany have shaped up if 
Aristotle had the benefit of current technologies and experimental data? As Freeland 
(1992) highlights:
About the lower end of the spectrum, for example, Aristotle maintains that the 
distinction between plant and animal is hard to draw. … He uses two sorts 
of information about an animal’s sensory capacities: first, anatomical obser-
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vations—as when he tries to resolve the status of certain doubtful creatures, 
the ascidians [sea squirts], which are rooted, ‘but yet they have some fleshy 
substance and therefore probably are capable of sensation of a kind’; and sec-
ondly, behavioral evidence—as when he adds to his remarks about the ascidi-
ans that they discharge a residue, something plants are not known to do. (Free-
land 1992)
Shortly before these passages,10 Aristotle notes of the Cephalopod ability to squirt 
ink that “Nature makes good use of this residue … for the animal’s defense and 
preservation” (Tipton 2013). Once again defying Aristotle’s assumptions, it is now 
known, for instance, that plants respond in a specific manner to herbivore-associated 
molecular patterns such as salivary proteins that are sensed via leaves (e.g. from 
the mouth of a leaf-chewing insect) (Züst and Agrawal 2017). In response, plants 
release jasmonate and a range of downstream compounds that discourage further 
herbivory. In other words, in at least two consequential cases—root-mediated com-
petitor interaction, and leaf-mediated predator interaction—plant anatomy supports 
sensation, and behavioral evidence indicates they ‘discharge a residue’ for their 
‘defense and preservation’.
Aristotle notwithstanding, these cases also make for interesting examples of niche 
construction (i.e. non-passive adaptation) in relation to biotic factors: plants actively 
displace other plants and animals from their microhabitat. Plants also engage in 
niche construction in relation to abiotic factors, such as light. In cyclical fashion, 
the plant’s perceptually guided growth requires fuel and nutrients, while this very 
growth reshapes their niche to optimize the plant’s fuel and nutrient acquisition.
Rife with anticipation
Moreover, the capacity of shoots and roots to navigate terrains where resources are 
patchily distributed—and whose distribution can change dramatically, as in the case 
of sunflecks—can be modelled as anticipatory behavior (Novoplansky 2016). Con-
sider how plants relate to a fleeting patch of light in particularly shady habitats. With 
plants being reliant on light for fuel, they exhibit complex behavioral responses 
to time-dependent changes in the light regime. A mere sunfleck that rapidly shifts 
throughout the day can be life-critical to under-canopy species—a single fleck last-
ing a few minutes may contain up to 50% of the daily sunlight intake (Taiz and 
Zeiger 2010). Whether cast as light seeking, or as escape or avoidance responses 
to shade, these behaviors require tracking and extrapolating from historical trends 
in the amount and spectral quality of light (Gundel et al. 2014). This extrapolation 
facilitates the timely control of physical patterns of growth, as plants must grow and 
branch differentially, depending upon the prospects to acquire light.
As with animals, such anticipatory adaptive responses can be observed as emerg-
ing from the coordinated interoperation of low-level physiological mechanisms. 
Shade-avoidance in plants exploits the way light is reflected under canopy, as canopy 
10 PA  681a25-35 above;  679a79-81 hereafter.
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gaps excite photoreceptors that respond to differences in the electromagnetic spec-
trum (Franklin and Whitelam 2005). Whereas phytochromes are sensitive to changes 
in the ratio of red to far-red (R:FR) light, cryptochromes and phototropins absorb the 
blue (B) and UV-A part of the spectrum. Plants integrate these light cues over time, 
and coordinate across the root and shoot systems (Baluška et  al. 2004; Trewavas 
2014). Changes in the R:FR ratio can alter root allocation and the morphology of the 
root apparatus overall (Gundel et al. 2014). The behavioral repertoire of plants thus 
emerges from a richly complex interplay between photosensory and other perceptual 
subsystems (Bastien et al. 2015). This interplay leads to long-distance pathway acti-
vation and downstream (e.g. hydraulic and chemical) responses (Gilroy et al. 2016; 
Huber and Bauerle 2016).
We have characterized a particular pattern of plant response to shade escape or 
avoidance that could be classed as an anticipatory defensive behavior. Even if this 
were considered a grey area, it is clear that multiple aspects of growth and defense 
form part of the plant behavioral repertoire. In this regard, it is notable that among 
plant scientists, “an emerging consensus … identifies negative associations between 
growth and defense not as the direct result of allocation costs, but rather as prior-
itization of one process over another” (Züst and Agrawal 2017). Such an account 
supports biologically grounded decision-theoretic models in which plants select an 
action from a range of growth and defensive alternatives.
As Calvo and Baluška (2015) point out, one of the commonalities among specific 
plants and animals is photosensory-induced acute stress escape behavior. Empirical 
studies of photophobia in plant roots demonstrate its behavioral robustness (Yokawa 
et  al. 2011, 2014). Properly defensive behavior against predators differs in key 
respects from other behavior that amounts to seeking hospitable conditions, such as 
avoiding the terrestrial surface to extend root growth underground. But this does not 
preclude plausibly hypothesized deep homologies between plant and animal behav-
ior. Both cases can be modelled as an aversive behavior emergent from a patterned 
interplay of perception and action.
Such patterned interplay can be cast as an inducible defense. Huey et al. (2002) 
predict stronger inducible defense in plants as compared to animals, by appeal-
ing explicitly to the sessile/mobile contrast (plants are unable to ‘run away’). We 
would counter, however, that strength in this sense is not univocally defined across 
response modalities. Thus, the combined respective defensive repertoires of plants 
and animals should be considered on par with one another, in so far as they have 
been selected for adequacy to survive and thrive.
On the animal side, Kane et  al. (2013) suggest that the reason Drosophila lar-
vae cease moving in abrupt darkness may relate to avoiding detection by a looming 
predator that casts its shadow over them. This appears to match the developmen-
tally dependent variant of this response in adult houseflies, whose darkness-induced 
escape behavior is (aerial) flight (Holmqvist and Srinivasan 1991). These responses 
are consistent with the under-canopy plants’ shade avoidance or escape behavior 
described above, as enduring shade induces acute stress. For underground maize 
roots, what amounts to the same model could be used to understand the relationship 
of physiology to emergent behavior, with only the poles of one parameter swapped. 
That is, a simple brightness vector captures the relevant photosensory apparatus for 
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the maize roots’ photophobia and the insects’ darkness aversion. This comparison 
should be taken as an illustration of how a biologically grounded model of a cogni-
tive phenomenon of interest—in this case, perceptual discrimination coupled with 
an appropriate behavioral response—could be modelled in a way that remains con-
sistent across plant and animal evidence.11
Conclusion
It seems that the line drawn between plants and animals cannot be held to be the 
very same line dividing non-cognitive and cognitive kinds. If particular physiologi-
cal features make cognition possible, one could assert that some animals have them, 
and no plants do—but then we are reduced to tautology, in that only animals can 
provide evidence for animal models of cognition. Alternatively, one could say that 
there is a general model of cognition, for which only animals provide evidence, and 
plants do not. But then one is faced with deciding at what (non-arbitrary) point all of 
the relevant capacities came into coherence to produce cognition, while maintaining 
that (e.g.) more ancient homologues of each feature are insufficient for cognition in 
their given organization. It seems that any principled way of drawing that boundary 
reflects pragmatic or aesthetic considerations, rather than locating a perspective-free 
carving of nature at its joints.
For example, the capacity of memory has been variously regarded as being a fea-
ture solely of mammalian brains, later contested by findings on insect brains, and 
now contested in part by non-brainbound notions of extended and distributed cogni-
tion. As we have pointed out, a similarly contested ground is underfoot for attribut-
ing memory to plants, alongside other cognitive capacities. It should therefore be 
taken as a given that scientific and philosophical normative shifts in models or con-
ceptions of cognitive capacities play a key role in specifying what counts as cog-
nition. This does not mean that the inquiry into cognition is ‘just semantics’, but 
rather, it means that we are at best only ever on the way to carving nature at its 
joints, but never arriving, due to the permanent prospect of revision.
The common trope of all observations being theory laden is especially high-
lighted by the notion that methodologically sound observations can be treated as 
evidence for a model. Theories of cognition effectively entail models, so care must 
be taken in the model definitions before judgments of exclusion by kind are made. 
If the concern is simply with morphological kinds, then many natural divisions may 
be relevant beyond having a brain or not, having a cortex or not, having compound 
eyes or not, and so on. But if the concern is with cognitive and non-cognitive kinds, 
we should not be so hasty in dismissing how coherently organized physiological 
networks of sensing, acting, memory, and learning within whole organisms provide 
evidence for models of cognition. We hope to have offered a non-zoocentric way of 
11 For a generalized animal example of this kind of model that includes mammals and insects, and could 
be extended to plants, see Linson et al. (2020).
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locating cognition beyond animals, while indicating that the continued exclusion of 
plants from the cognitive club is unwarranted.
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